Plato
(427–347 B.C.E.) is notorious for attacking art in Book 10 of his Republic .
According
to Plato's Theory of Forms, objects in this world are imitations or
approximations
of ideal Forms that are the true reality. A chair in this world is just
an
imitation or instantiation of the Form of Chair. That being the case, art is
twice
removed
from reality, as it is just an imitation of an imitation: a painting of a chair
is
an
imitation of a chair which is in turn an imitation of the Form of Chair.
Further,
Plato
argues that art serves to excite the emotions, which can detract from the
balanced
reasoning that is essential to virtue.Plato, Republic
Art
is imitation, and that’s bad.
Nature
is only true oher materials are imitation or copy of truth
Literature
art everything are the imitation of the true
Carpenter
and chair
Chair
in the mind
Painter
imitated the chair
Painter
chair is twice to remove from reality
Poetry
spoils the young mind
Plato;s
view rejected
Problems
with imitation:
Epistemological:
An imitation is at three removes from the reality or truth of
something
(example of bed).
Theological:
Poets and other artists represent the gods in inappropriate ways.
Moral and
Psychological:
A good imitation can undermine the stability of even the
best
humans by making us feel sad, depressed, and sorrowful about life itself.
Art
is imitation, and that’s all right, even good.
Imitation is
natural to humans from childhood.
Imitation is how
children learn, and we all learn from imitations.
Tragedy can be a
form of education that provides moral insight and fosters
emotional
growth.
Plato
takes the term ‘mimesis’ with several meanings and connotations in the
dialogues
and
alters the meaning of the term according to the context in which he uses it. He
uses
‘mimesis’
in the context of the education of the youth; he discusses the function of
‘mimesis’ as
likening
oneself to another in speech and bodily behaviour and as addressing the lower
part of
man’s
soul; he also refers to the epistemology and metaphysics of the concept. He
takes the
word
‘mimesis’ with pedagogic attributes and uses it in educational and ethical
context when he
says
‘guardians of an ideal state should be educated to imitate only what is
appropriate’5. In the
third
book of the Republic, for instance, Plato provides further definitions of
‘mimesis’, centering
on
the relation between ‘mimesis’ and poetry, ‘mimesis’ and education and also
poetry and
education.
‘Since young people learn essentially through imitation, it is significant to
select the
models’6.
‘Mimesis suggests unfavorable effect on the part of the young people’ and
‘poetry is
one
important source of the youth’s experience with examples and models’;
therefore, if the
world
of models and examples ought to be controlled in the interest of education,
poetry must
be
likewise subject to control7. Plato argues the case in the Republic as follow:
beliefs
they acquire at the age are hard to expunge and usually remain
unchanged.
That is important that the first stories they hear should be well told
and
dispose them to virtue8.
‘mimesis’
is distinct from mimicry, which implies only a physical and no
mental,
relation: a person regards the ‘Other’ as equal and assumes the ‘Other ‘ to be
doing the
same
in reverse. In this respect, a person who imitates is doomed to self-sacrifice
and lack of
self-identity.
Moreover, the process of mimetic identification becomes a source of pleasure in
the
form of tragedy, which correspondingly frames the myth or re-enacts to
substitute the myth
in
the form of dramatic representation. In the seventh book of the Republic, which
is about law,
he
states ‘we are ourselves authors of tragedy, and that the finest and the best
we know how to
make’.
In fact, our whole polity has been constructed as a dramatization (mimetic) of
noble and
perfect
life; that is what we hold to be truth in the most of real tragedies’. However,
in art,
‘mimesis’
has a different function. Aesthetically, ‘mimesis’ refers to misrepresentation.
Reality
and
truth can only be understood through reason. The artist works with inspiration
and
imagination:
the two faculties don’t give us the true image of reality, and the end of
tragedy is a
partial
loss of moral identity.
Plato,
Demiurge creates the idea and by beholding the idea the Demiurge
produces
the object; his ability is exalted in the imitation of the Idea. The poet, on
the other
hand,
creates the images neither by seeing the idea nor from more substantive
knowledge of
the
object since he produces nothing but phenomena by holding up a mirror. In this
sense, the
artist
produces appearance and his work cannot provide us with true insight. Then,
when a poet
writes
about the bed, for instance, it is not a bed manufactured by the craftsman from
the idea
nor
does it have any relation to the real bed; it is only simulation and phenomena.
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Plato
admits that every object in nature is a reflection of the Idea, he doesn’t
object
to the reflection of object in nature. Plato uses mirror and water as constant
metaphors
to
clarify the relationship between reality and the reflection of eidon. Plato
argues that the poet
holds
up mirror to nature and in his work we see the reflection of nature not
reality. He objects
to
the reflection of objects in the mirror, since things are divided into two
parts: visible and
intelligible.
The first of the visible things is the class of copies, which includes shadows
and
reflections
in the mirror. The second class of visible things is that of which the previous
is a
likeliness
or copy. Plato objects to the reflection of object in the mirror, since mirror
(poet)
imprisons
and limits the image. And he also objects to the imitation, since the poet
imitates
without
knowledge. Therefore, it is not its imitative character but its lack of truth
and knowledge,
which
brings poetry to its low estate. Homer and all the poetic tribe are imitators
of images of
virtue
and other things but they do not rely on truth. Poetry, after all, is a madness
that seizes
the
soul when it contemplates in true knowledge of goods.
‘as
an imitation of human action that is serious, complete and of a certain
magnitude;
in language embellished with every kind of artistic ornament, the
various
kinds being found in different parts of the play; it represents man in
action
rather than using narrative, through pity and fear effecting the proper
purgation
of these emotion’20.
Aristotle
Plato
argues that there is a duality between art (mimesis and narrative art) and
ethics.
The
more poetic the poems are the less suited are they to the ears of men.
Artistically, the
better
the comedy is, the worst it is, since the more attractive and perfect the
comedy is the
more
disastrous its effects are. For instance, Homer, in the “Iliad” tells us or narrates
the story of
cypresses,
as he was himself a cypress. He tells the story as far as it makes the audience
feel
that
not Homer is the speaker, but the priest, an old man. This manner of
representation
(impersonation),
according to Plato, leads to the loss-of-self or transformation of identity and
becomes
a matter of moral destruction. Aristotle takes the same activity of
impersonation in a
different
way. He praises Homer for not telling excessively in his own voice since, after
a few
words
he immediately brings on stage a man or woman or some other characters that
represent
the
action with larger perspective.
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4.
Imitation, Inspiration, Beauty
Mimêsis
fails in two ways. 1) It originates in appearance rather than in reality, so
that judged on its own
terms
the product of imitation has an ignoble pedigree (Republic 603b). 2) The
imitative arts positively
direct
a soul toward appearances, away from proper objects of inquiry. A mirror
reflection might prompt
you
to look at the thing being reflected; an imitation keeps your eyes on the copy
alone. In short, imitation
has
a base cause and baser effects. (Note that while Plato's critique depends on
both these claims, he
really
only substantiates the first one.)
Beauty
by comparison begins in the domain of intelligible objects, since there is a
Form of beauty. And
more
than any other property for which a Form exists, beauty engages the soul and
draws it toward
philosophical
deliberation, toward thoughts of absolute beauty and likely toward thoughts of
other
concepts.
Plato
therefore hates to acknowledge that poems contain any beauty. But he does not
go so far as to call
mimêsis
beauty's opposite, and to accuse poems or paintings of ugliness. He hardly
could. It is bad
enough
for his view that he does not account for an imitative poem's appeal; to deny
the appeal would rob
his
account of plausibility.
Nor
can a good (philosophical) version of imitation work as opposite to the poetic
kind. Plato recognizes
a
salutary function that imitations sometimes have, even the function of drawing
the mind toward
knowledge.
But Plato offers no more than suggestive hints about positive mimêsis. There is
no account of
sound
imitation comparable to the attacks in the Republic. In any case this is a
constructive turn that never
seems
to be made available to poems or paintings. If good imitation does exist, its
home is not among the
arts.
Still the idea invites a worthwhile question: Is there anything human beings
can produce that would
function
oppositely to mimetic poetry? Inspiration is the most promising possibility.
The
cause behind inspiration is unimpeachable, for it begins in the divine realm.
Is that a realm of Forms?
The
Phaedrus comes closest to saying so, both by associating the gods with Forms
(247c–e) and by
rooting
inspired love in recollection (251a). But this falls short of showing that the
poets' divine madness
likewise
originates among objects of greater reality. It might, but does not have to.
The
Ion says less about poetry's divine origins than the Phaedrus, certainly
nothing that requires an
interpreter
to discover Forms within the Muse's magnetism. Laws 682a and Meno 99c–d credit
the
inspired
condition with the production of truths, even in poetry. Neither passage
describes the sorts of
truths
that philosophical dialectic would lead to, i.e. truths about Forms, but that
might be asking too
much.
Let it suffice that inspiration originates in some truth.
What
about the effects of inspired poetry? Could such poetry turn a soul toward
knowledge as beautiful
faces
do? Poetry's defenders will find scant support for that proposal in the
dialogues. Inspired poetry has
its
merits but Plato rarely credits it with promoting philosophical knowledge.
Indeed the Ion conceives
inspiration
as the cause of the worst cognitive state, for the poet's possession by the
Muses is what causes
the
audience's attachment to that single poet. The Phaedrus does say that Muse-made
poems teach future
generations
about the exploits of heroes. Inspired poetry at least might set a good
example. But one can
find
good examples in verse without waiting for inspiration. Even Republic 3 allows
for instances in
which
the young guardians imitate virtuous characters. The educational consequences
of inspired poetry
do
not set it apart from imitative poetry, and they never include philosophical
education.\
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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http://plato-philosophy.org/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plato
